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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT RATIFY THE
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD

RICHARD G. WILKINS,* ADAM BECKER,**
JEREMY HARRIS,*** AND DONLU THAYER****

INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly without a vote in 1989,1 is the “most
comprehensive single treaty” ever to appear in the field of human rights.2 In
the ten years following its entry into force in September 1990, the CRC has
been ratified by 191 states – including every member of the United Nations
(UN) except two. The fact that the two non-ratifying nations are the United
States and Somalia3 illustrates the paradoxes surrounding this remarkable
instrument of international law, which, in spite of nearly universal ratification,
continues to be the focus of intense debate.
The CRC is the first purportedly legally binding international instrument to
address children’s issues comprehensively.4 This fact guarantees that the CRC
will command the careful attention of the world community. Both the 1924
Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child and the 1959 United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of the Child “laudably urge the protection and
personal development of children and seek to improve children’s health,
nutrition, safety, and education.”5 The CRC, however, seeks much wider
influence; no mere declaration urging correct attitudes and benign protective
* Richard G. Wilkins is a Professor of Law at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. He is also the Managing Director of The World Family Policy Center at BYU.
** Adam Becker received his J.D. Degree from the J. Reuben Clark Law School in 2003.
*** Jeremy Harris is a J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 2004.
**** Donlu Harris is a J.D. Candidates, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 2004.
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 13, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 48,
[hereinafter CRC].
2. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 511 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
3. Somalia signed the CRC on May 9, 2002, but has not yet fully ratified the convention.
4. David P. Stewart, Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 161, 162 (1998).
5. Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan O. Hafen, Abandoning Children to their Autonomy: The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 449, 450 (1996).
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behavior, the CRC charts “new territory”6 in the field of children’s rights,
“moving beyond protection rights to choice rights for children.”7 In promoting
a “new concept of separate rights for children with the Government accepting
[the] responsibility of protecting the child from the power of parents”8 and
“recogniz[ing] that children should have rights identical to adults,”9 the CRC
comes squarely into conflict with traditional American notions of family and
family law.
Indeed, the refusal of the United States to ratify the treaty since President
Clinton signed the CRC in February 1995 reflects not a “failure” as claimed by
many CRC proponents,10 but, rather, the continuing uncertainty as to whether
ratification of the CRC will help or harm children. We fear the CRC may be
bad for children because it creates expansive autonomy rights for children
incapable of fully understanding – let alone wisely executing – those rights. In
turn, the CRC may be bad for the country because it calls for an exercise of
congressional power beyond limits prescribed by the Constitution.11
We will argue, therefore, against the ratification of the CRC by the United
States on two grounds. First, we believe the CRC’s newly minted autonomy
rights are neither beneficial to children nor harmonious with traditional notions
of salutary family life (as expressed, incidentally, in the Preamble to the CRC

6. U.N. DEP’T OF PUB. INFO., CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: WORLD
CAMPAIGN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS at 3, U.N.Doc. DPI/1101, U.N. Sales No. E.91.I.51 (1991).
7. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 450.
8. UNITED NATIONS 1994/95 PUBLICATIONS CATALOGUE at 64, quoted in Hafen & Hafen,
supra note 5, at 450.
9. Michael Jupp, Confronting the Challenge of Realizing Human Rights Now: Rights of
Children: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: An Opportunity for
Advocates, 34 HOW. L.J. 15, 21 (1991) (noting, however, that there may be some exceptions, such
as during wartime) 16, T. 14 , quoted in Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 451.
10. Stewart, supra note 4, at n. 9. “Signature of a treaty does not entail a legal commitment
to ratify but does obligate the signatory to refrain from taking actions which would defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 336 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, A GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES”
(Sharon Detrick ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992) [hereinafter CRC,TP] (detailing the role
of the U.S. delegation in drafting the Convention).
11. Ratification of the CRC with Reservations would not appear to be a viable option, given
the nature of the U.S. objections. See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 337. “A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
formulate a reservation unless: (a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty; (b) the treaty
provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may
be made; or (c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty (emphasis added).” Id.
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itself).12 Second, we have concluded that the CRC’s sweeping reconstruction
of family life lies beyond Congress’ reach.
I. THE MODERN FAMILY AND THE PROLIFERATION OF RIGHTS
The Preamble to the CRC echoes the 1948 call of the world community to
protect the family as “the natural and fundamental group unit of society.”13
According to some, however, this “natural” and “fundamental” group unit is no
longer defined by reference to nature. Rather, the “group unit” known as the
family takes “various forms,”14 defined primarily by emerging gender and
human rights discourse.15 This development is problematic. “As one traces
the evolution of the treatment of the family in UN documents, it is apparent
that [this] human rights discourse has introduced fragmentation into policies
regarding the family.”16
In this new vision of the family, biological and hierarchical relationships
are irrelevant. The focus is not upon the family as a natural unit, but upon the
free association of autonomous individuals, regardless of kinship, gender or
age. It is within this context that the notion of childhood rights reflected in the
12. See CRC, supra note 1, pmbl. paras. 6-7.
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, art. 16.3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
14. See Programme of Action of the United Nations International Conference on Population
and Development, International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo ‘94), pts. 5.1,
5.9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13, (1994), available at http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/reports&doc/
icpdpoae.html. See also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the Twenty-Third
Special Session of the General Assembly: Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (Beijing +5), U.N. GAOR, 23rd Special Sess., Supp
No. 3, pts. 60, 82(c), U.N. Doc. A/S-23/10/Rev. 1, (2000).
15. Maria Sophia Aguirre & Ann Wolfgram, United Nations Policy and the Family:
Redefining the Ties that Bind: A Study of History, Forces and Trends, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 113 n.4.
(2002). “This view is clearly reflected in some of the conventions and declarations specifically
addressing women’s rights and family issues that followed . . . This view was also reflected in the
Programmes of Action produced by the UN conferences, which include specific chapters
addressing women, children, and the family, independently of the subject matter of the
conference.” Id.
16. Aguirre & Wolfgram, supra note 15, at 177.
Human rights language, understood in the Lockean sense, is limited to individual rights
and fails to acknowledge the hierarchical and interconnected nature of all rights. . . . The
family is critical to the maintenance of civil society. . . The home is where human beings
learn how to live in society; it is where they learn friendship and love for their fellow
man. . . . The family is multidimensional, material and spiritual, and as such, has the
capacity to affect every sector of society. . . . International and national policy must begin
to address these dimensions. . . . Civil society depends on the family for its own health
and well-being; if policy makers continue to demean or reduce the family and fail to
address it in its multidimensional character, civil society will necessarily suffer.
Id. at 177-78.
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CRC arose. In such a context, children’s traditional “protection” rights came
to be overshadowed by “provision” rights, as well as a “totally new right” – an
autonomous right of “individual personality”—or what some have called the
right to “participate” in society.17
In the constitutional culture of the United States, the prevailing attitude was
(and still is) that the purpose of rights is to insulate and protect people from
government power. The only right that makes sense is one that places
restrictions on government action against individuals. [These are “first
generation” rights.] Second generation rights are, in essence, requirements that
government provide certain benefits and services to the public (such as
education, work, social security, or culture), and this was deemed incompatible
with a system of ordered liberty. Government might (as a political necessity)
provide such public goods, but they are not legally required to do so. . . . [In
addition,] many regional institutions have been moving towards recognition of
new classes of human rights. Among these are “third generation” rights to
peace, development and environment.18

Children, under such burgeoning rights schemes, are now proclaimed to be
the “equal” of their parents.19 Nevertheless, and despite this new mandate of
equality, the CRC requires parents and others to develop a child’s “personality,
17. “[T]here is no doubt whatsoever that the content of the Convention constitutes a major
leap forward in standard-setting on children’s issues. On a general level, we can note the
introduction of ‘participation’ rights which had never before been incorporated in a child-focused
international instrument.” Nigel Cantwell, The Origins, Development and Significance of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, in CRC,TP, supra note 10, at 19, 28.
18. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 97, 102 (2000).
19. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 454.
Not until the early 1970s did the first ‘kiddie libbers’ appear, arguing for the first time that
the legal rights of minors – children under age eighteen – should be regarded as
“coextensive with those of adults,” and that children “are autonomous individuals, entitled
to the same rights and privileges before the law as adults.” Some of the new child
advocates urged in broadly unrealistic ways the removal of all traditional restraints that
were based solely on a child’s age – including the removal of minority legal status itself.
Since that time, some writers have focused their arguments more precisely, advocating a
shift in the presumption of childhood incapacity. These writers are urging that the law
presume children capable of autonomous legal action unless the evidence in an individual
case shows otherwise (citations omitted).
Id. at 453. Perhaps the most prominent advocate of such a shift is Hillary Rodham Clinton. See,
e.g., Hillary Rodham, Children’s Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN’S RIGHTS:
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21, 33 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979). For a
brief discussion of Hillary Rodham Clinton’s views in this regard, see Jonathan O. Hafen,
Children’s Rights and Legal Representation – The Proper Roles of Children, Parents, and
Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 423, 431-36 (1993). Others are more
willing to presume that young children lack legal capacity, but they have advocated using
customized, subjective determinations of personal capacity rather than traditional age-based
classifications.
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talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential,”20 while
maintaining the child’s “own cultural identity, language and values.”21 This is
indeed a tall order and it is small wonder that, in spite of the near-universal
ratification, agreement upon the value of the Convention’s objectives and
implementation regime is far from universal.
In fact, “States Parties are routinely faulted by the Committee on the
Rights of the Child for their failure to fully implement their obligations.”22
Such failures can arise from criticisms agreeing in principle with our own,
though different from them in form:
Whilst there is an international consensus of concern for children, that does not
mean that there is a consensus about the policies needed to bring about an
improvement in child welfare. The experience and perceptions of childhood
vary fundamentally in different countries, but the Convention assumes a model
of childhood that is universally applicable “based on the notion that children
everywhere have the same basic needs and that these can be met with a
standard set of responses”. . . The Western “protective view of childhood”, as
Aron Bar-On explains, “has resulted from a combination of circumstances that
are not part of the experience of most countries of the South”. This
construction of childhood arose in the particular circumstances of the Northern
developed countries . . . Childhood remains a luxury that is unrealisable for the
majority of the population in developing countries.”23

According to these critics, because the CRC requires “the universal attainment
of a modern Western childhood,”24 it may embody a sub silentio judgment that
Southern societies have violated their children. Accordingly, the plight of
children in the South becomes “a sign of the moral failings of their society.
The imperative of the best interests of the child gives outside agencies the
legitimacy and powers to intervene. . . . In other words, the discourse on
children’s rights infantilizes [and even criminalizes] the South.”25
The members of the Committee have not been oblivious to such criticisms.
Accordingly, in 2001, the Committee asserted that:
Children’s rights are not detached or isolated values devoid of context, but
exist within a broader ethical framework which is partly described in Article

20. CRC, supra note 1, art. 29(1)(a).
21. CRC supra note 1, art. 29(1)(c).
22. Stewart, supra note 4, at n.8. (citing e.g., Concluding Observations on the Initial Report
of Bulgaria, in Report on the Fourteenth Session, U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 14th
Sess., paras. 25- 59, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/62 (1997); Concluding Observations on the Initial Report
of Panama, in id. paras. 98-134.
23. Vanessa Pupavac, The Infantilization of the South and the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 517-18.
24. Id. at 518.
25. Id.
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29 (1) and in the Preamble to the Convention. Many of the criticisms that have
been made of the Convention are specifically answered by this provision.
Thus, for example, this article underlines the importance of respect for parents,
of the need to view rights within their broader ethical, moral, spiritual, cultural
or social framework, and of the fact that most children’s rights, far from being
externally imposed, are embedded within the values of local communities.26

Nevertheless, the fact remains that not all “local communities” are equal in
“ethical, moral, spiritual, cultural or social framework.” Thus, the rights
accorded children worldwide are not uniformly defined and protected. In the
United States, the rights of children are guarded by the felt legitimacy of
deeply rooted traditions of civil order, law and custom. Children in some other
nations – we might mention Somalia, for instance – have not been so fortunate.
Thus, where children are oppressed and endangered, the objectives and
provisions of the CRC might provide a framework for improvement.27 By
contrast, in a framework such as the one found in the United States, the CRC is
an unwelcome and unnecessary intrusion.28 We now turn, then, to a
consideration of why we find autonomy rights so alarming.

26. General Comment on the Aims of Education Article 29(1), U.N. Comm. on the Rts. Of
the Child, para. 7, U.N. Doc CRC/GC/2001/1 (2001).
27. We admire, for instance, the two Optional Protocols opened for signature, and quickly
signed by President Clinton, in mid 2000. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/263 (2000) [hereinafter CRCOPAC] The CRCOPAC reinforces the CRC commitment
to keep children under eighteen out of the armed services, avoids conflict with U.S. practice by
permitting voluntary recruitment of children under eighteen when accompanied by “a description
of safeguards . . . adopted to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced.” Id. art. 3(2).
Such recruitment is to be “carried out with the informed consent of the person’s parents or legal
guardians” Id. art. 3(3)(b). Moreover, article 5 provides that “[n]othing in the present Protocol
shall be construed as precluding provision in the law of a State Party or in international
humanitarian law that are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child.” Id. art. 5.
Equally admirable is the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child
Pornography. [hereinafter CRCOPSC]. Though, typically enough, the language of the
instrument presents a paradox: The introduction to CRCOPSC contains a passage with which
millions of laboring families, including United States farm families (at least until quite recently)
might take issue, language recognizing “the right of the child to be protected from economic
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the
child’s education.” Id. para.2. See also, id. art. 8(1)(e) (“Protecting, as appropriate, the privacy
and identity of child victims and taking measures in accordance with national law to avoid the
inappropriate dissemination of information that could lead to the identification of child victims
(emphasis added).”).
28. See Kevin Mark Smith, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: The
Sacrifice of American Children on the Altar of Third-World Activism, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 111,
149 (1998) (which concludes that:
something must be done to alleviate the plight of the world’s children . . . however, the
CRC may cause more harm than it prevents . . . Moreover, if an already effective system
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II. THE DANGERS OF THE TRULY AUTONOMOUS CHILD
In this section we will argue that it is not prudent to embrace a document
that moves toward giving children unprecedented autonomy rights. Prior to
the adoption of the CRC, no legal system in the world granted autonomy rights
to children.29 In fact, legal systems generally limited “children’s autonomy in
the short run in order to maximize their development of actual autonomy in the
long run,”30 an approach that “encourages development of the personal
competence needed to produce an ongoing democratic society comprised of
persons capable of autonomous and responsible action.”31 To “short-circuit
this process by legally granting – rather than actually teaching – autonomous
capacity to children ignores the realities of education and child development to
the point of abandoning children to a mere illusion of real autonomy.”32
Children are not autonomous. They are, by definition, “immature”33 –
socially, mentally, emotionally, and physically. Hence, societies keep children
from driving automobiles, from shooting guns, drinking alcohol, smoking,
voting, viewing sexually explicit movies and photographs, and entering into
binding contracts. Such “deprivations” protect children (and others) from the
consequences of their immaturity. Adults impose such limitations not from
arrogance or cruelty, but from wisdom. “Children who are pushed into adult
experience[s] do not become precociously mature. On the contrary, they cling
to childhood longer, perhaps all their lives.”34
[Y]ears of serious struggling with these issues in one of the world’s cultures
most friendly to ideas about personal autonomy has not persuaded most United
States courts and legislatures that – short of actual neglect – state agencies (or

of [law within the United States] is preempted by the CRC, state and local governments
will be unable to respond to protect children’s rights. . . The CRC may be the only viable
solution to third-world children’s rights abuses. The United States, however, must not
sacrifice the welfare of its own children to eliminate such abuses. The price is simply too
high.)
See also, id. at 127, (stating “[t]he United States legal system . . . has already implemented
protective measures which ensure that children’s rights are enforced. Adoption of the CRC is
therefore unnecessary for the enforcement of the rights of American children.”)
29. Hafen & Hafen , supra note 5, at 459 (quoting the drafters of the CRC as creating, for
children, “the ‘totally new right’ of individual personality” independent of parental control).
30. Id. at 491.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. CRC, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 9.
34. Peter Neubauer, quoted in MARIE WINN, CHILDREN WITHOUT CHILDHOOD ch. 13
(Pantheon Books 1983), available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/87/41387.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2003).
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children themselves) are better equipped than the nation’s parents to assume
parental roles.35

From our point of view, then, the rapid and near universal ratification of
the CRC more clearly represents a general consensus that children are
important to the members of the world community than it reflects careful
consideration of probable consequences of implementing the CRC’s
provisions.36 While we applaud the CRC for provisions that do much to
protect children from those who would exploit their vulnerability,37 we cannot
admire those treaty provisions – notably the “civil rights” provisions, articles
13-16 – that appear to move away from protecting children and toward
granting children greater ability to make decisions traditionally reserved for
adults. Moreover, any attempt to enforce such provisions in the United States
must confront a tradition of legal jurisprudence that severely limits the state’s
ability to intrude upon the family.38
“Among the fundamental axioms of United States law is the doctrine that
the parent-child relationship antedates the state just as natural individual rights
antedate the state in the Constitution’s political theory.”39 United States laws
that govern aspects of the parent-child relationship focus primarily upon
35. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 491.
36. Id. at 489-90.
It is quite possible that many members of the international community have simply not
understood either the CRC’s language or its conceptual novelty. Given the complexities
of language translation in an area where nuanced phrasing and subtle legal distinctions are
at the heart of the arguments, this is a believable interpretation. . . . The surprisingly rapid
global acceptance of the CRC since 1989 may well have been hastened by two faulty
assumptions. One . . . is that the CRC simply restates principles long recognized by the
United Nations. The CRC’s own drafters have stated, with some pride, that this is not the
case. A second flawed assumption is that the CRC simply reflects contemporary United
States legal approaches to individuals [sic] rights for children, which implies that the
United Nations would have been behind the times not to adopt what purported to be an
enlightened American concept. . . . Since neither of these significant assumptions is
correct, there is reason to wonder whether the CRC’s proponents have somehow pulled it
up by its own bootstraps . . . [T]he CRC’s ideas about child autonomy as a legal rather
than a merely developmental concept apparently originated in American minds.
Id.
37. See, e.g., CRCOPAC and CRCOPSC, supra note 27.
38. GUGGENHEIM ET AL., AN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION HANDBOOK: THE RIGHTS
OF FAMILIES 87-92 (Norman Dorsen ed., Southern Illinois University Press 1996) (stating further
that “children have the right to be raised by their parents free from unjustified interference by
state officials.” Id. at 87.) The ACLU handbook also notes that family rights are held in “very
high esteem.” Id. at 88. “It might even be said that they command the highest respect of all
personal rights protected by the Constitution. The Supreme Court has determined that the right of
family integrity exists, despite no specific reference to it in the Constitution, among the penumbra
of other rights protected by the Constitution.” Id.
39. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 449, 462.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT RATIFY

419

protecting children from exploitation of their inexperience and incapacity
rather than upon ensuring that children have an enforceable “right to be left
alone,” free from parental interference in their choices.40 For this reason, we
must reject the CRC that, in spite of its restating “many time-honored themes
about children,” also seeks to “alter United States laws regarding age limits,
parental rights, and children’s rights to expression, media access, privacy, and
religion.”41
A.

United States Legal Protection and the CRC

For two centuries, United States laws have limited the rights given to
children, not only to protect children from abusive or negligent adults, but also
to protect children from themselves.42 “To confer the full range of choice
rights on a child is also to confer the burdens and responsibilities of adult legal
status, which necessarily removes the protection rights of childhood.”43 The
United States, therefore, has developed strong legal commitments dedicated to
protecting children from both the inexperience of youthfulness and the
exploitations of others.44 Children are limited, for instance, in controlling and
managing real property, participating in litigation, or in making a will.45
Children may also disaffirm contracts made during minority, and local
legislatures may make special provisions governing obscenity.46 Statutory
rape laws, compulsory school attendance laws, modified standards for tort
liability, and limitations on activities such as playing video games in public
game parlors are also designed for the protection of children.47 For good
reasons, then, United States courts are not willing to recognize that children are
40. Id. at 452.
41. Id. at 449.
42. G. Diane Dodson, Legal Rights of Adolescents: Restrictions on Liberty, Emancipation,
and Status Offenses, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 114, 120 (Robert M. Horowitz and Howard
A Davidson eds., 1984.) (“[a] number of legal rules are designed to protect society from the
effects of youthful immaturity, as well as protect the young person him or herself”).
43. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 461.
Choice rights . . . grant individuals the authority to make affirmative and legally binding
decisions, such as voting, marrying, making contracts, exercising religious preferences, or
choosing whether and how to be educated. The very concept of minority status, reflected
in statutes in every United States jurisdiction, denies underage children independent
choices on such matters. This denial is not a way of discriminating against children, but is
a way of protecting them, and society, from the long-term consequences of a child’s
immature choices and from exploitation by those who would take advantage of a child’s
unique vulnerability.
Id.
44. See generally, GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note 38.
45. See Dodson, supra note 42, at 120.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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empowered with all the liberties that are afforded adults, as we shall explain in
the sections that follow.
1. Free Speech and Free Association
The United States Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York48 held that
states could constitutionally prohibit the sale of obscene material to minors on
the basis of its prurient interest to them, regardless of whether the material
would be obscene to adults. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, argued
that liberty was contingent upon competence:
I think that a state may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely
delineated areas, a child – like someone in a captive audience – is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only upon such a premise,
I should suppose, that a State may deprive children of other rights – the right to
marry, for example, or the right to vote – deprivations that would be
constitutionally intolerable for adults.49

By eliminating the choice available for children of whether consume
obscene materials, the Court in Ginsberg validated local laws that sought to
protect children from the dangers of exposure to pornography.50 However, the
belief that pornography is harmful to children is no longer universally held.
Some child “experts” believe that pornography and even unrestrained sexual
behavior are good for children.51 Parents and other caregivers who want to
48. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-638 (1968).
49. Id. at 649-50. But see Gary B. Melton, Children’s Competence to Consent: A Problem
in Law and Social Science, in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1, 9 (Gary B. Melton et al.
eds., 1983) (arguing that by the Supreme Court claiming minors to be “persons” within the
meaning of the Constitution, “the Court has opened the door to consideration of the
circumstances under which minors might rationally be extended the freedom or protection of
constitutional rights.” However, Melton also recognizes that several Justices on the court have
found little reason to find that minors are competent to make their own decisions and thus any
strike change in precedent seems unlikely. Id. at 9).
50. See Corinne Sweet, Pornography and Addiction: A Political Issue 179, 191-192 and
Edna F. Einsiedel, The Experimental Research Evidence: Effects of Pornography on the
“Average Individual” 248, 248 in PORNOGRAPHY: WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A
RADICAL NEW VIEW (Catherine Itzin ed., 1993). Einsiedel documents several studies that show
negative effects of pornography on the average male and female.
51. See, e.g., Anne Hendershott, The Paradox of the Postmodern Pedophile, THE SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, April 26, 2002 at B-9, (noting that the coming publication of JUDITH
LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX (2002) by the
University of Minnesota Press promises a “a radical, refreshing and long overdue reassessment of
how we think and act about children’s and teens’ sexuality.” In published interviews on the
University of Minnesota’s web site, author Judith Levine decries the fact that there are people
“pushing a conservative religious agenda that would deny minors access to sexual expression”
and adds that “[w]e do have to protect children from real dangers. . . . But that doesn’t mean
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counter such attitudes—who want to protect children by restraining their
access to potentially harmful sexual practices and pornographic materials—
could be undermined by the broadly worded language of CRC article 13,
granting children “the right to freedom of expression,” including the right to
“seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers . . . through any other media of the child’s choice.”52
The language of article 13 seems, therefore, to empower children with
potential rights incompatible with United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Burger in Parham v. J.R.53 observed that “[m]ost children, even
in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many
decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and
must make those judgments.”54
In addition to article 13’s broad grant of power, CRC article 16 demands
that “[n]o child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
or her privacy, family, home or correspondence. . .”55 This article, alone and
or in conjunction with article 13, could raise problems for parents and schools
wishing to control children’s access topornography—among other things—on
the Internet. By preventing “unlawful interference” with a child’s “privacy,”
article 16 has the potential to place the basic ability to discipline and monitor
children – activities necessary for effective parenting – into serious doubt. The
CRC does include article 17, which asks participating countries to include
information that protects children from “injurious material,” and it opposes
sexual abuse in article 19.56 However, the broad references made in article 13
seem to have a tenuous relationship, at best, with any restrictive language that
could be found in these other articles.57
In cases dealing with children’s rights to freedom of association, United
States courts have collectively permitted laws that regulate young persons’
access to pool halls, bowling alleys, dance halls, and videogame arcades.58 An
Illinois court found that restrictions on video games were permissible in light
of the evidence that such games could lead to “modeling of antisocial behavior
and deindividuation and hence to an increased propensity for delinquent
behavior.”59 The United States Supreme Court in City of Dallas v. Stenglin60

protecting some fantasy of their sexual innocence.”
The interview is available at
http://www.upress.umn.edu/HarmfultoMinorsQandA.html).
52. CRC, supra note 1, at art. 13.
53. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
54. Id.
55. CRC, supra note 1, at art. 16.
56. Id. art. 19; see also Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 469.
57. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 469.
58. See Dodson, supra note 42, at 131-34.
59. Id. at 133.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

422

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:411

upheld a local ordinance that prevented young people between the ages of
fourteen and seventeen from mixing with older persons in dance halls.61 CRC
article 15, on the other hand, ensures a child’s right of association and peaceful
assembly.62
2. Religion
In 1972 the Court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder,63 ruling a law which
required parents to send their children to school until age sixteen violated
Amish parents’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court found for
the parents’ right to remove their children from school in accordance with their
Amish beliefs that children are best served by leaving school upon completion
of the eighth grade. Only Justice Douglas dissented: “[i]t is the student’s
judgment, not his parents’ that is essential if . . . [students are] to be masters of
their own destiny.”64 Ironically, this statement from Justice Douglas’s dissent
is the oft-cited view of child autonomy advocates.65 Based on this minority
view, these advocates have tenuously (although successfully) asserted “the
right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”66
American law, of course, protects children who may be forced by their
parents to participate in activities that could be harmful or exploitative.67 But
religious training in the home is a powerful tool, valued by a great many
parents as a way to teach children essential principles of morality and ethics.
Allowing children to decide their religious upbringing completely for
themselves risks leaving them to the moral and ethical training of the schools
and their peers. This is an outcome that is unacceptable to a great many
American parents, incompatible with United States jurisprudence, and
disharmonious with the assertions of the Preamble to the CRC itself.68

60. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1989).
61. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 469-70.
62. CRC, supra note 1, art. 15.
63. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
64. Id. at 245 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
65. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 471.
66. CRC, supra note 1, art. 14.
67. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 159 (1944) (upholding children labor laws, when
the child, a Jehovah’s Witness, was selling religious tracts under the supervision of her
custodian).
68. CRC, supra note 1, pmbl. paras. 6-7, (stating,
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children,
should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its
responsibilities within the community, Recognizing that the child, for the full and
harmonious, development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding . . . )
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3. Privacy
At common law, consent of the parents, either express or implied, is
necessary to authorize medical treatment of a minor.69 One possible reason for
this rule was that parents were considered to know best when their child was
injured or suffering and was in need of medical attention. Although most
states have codified a common-law exception allowing doctors to treat children
in emergency situations,70 it is still generally recognized that children need a
parent’s consent before they may seek medical assistance. Besides emergency
situations, United States courts have not recognized a child’s right of privacy
except in two limited circumstances – abortion and birth control.71
However, even in finding that children are free to make their own
decisions concerning abortion, both Justices Powell and Stewart, as part of the
majority in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,72 were concerned with whether
or not to bear a child “is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under
emotional stress, may be ill equipped to make it without mature advice and
emotional support.
It seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel and support from
the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant
minors frequently take place.”73
Moreover, while the Court has taken the unusual step of granting
reproductive rights to children, Professor Hafen has observed that:
[t]his difference arises primarily from the extraordinary circumstance that a
pregnant minor is herself a prospective parent who would not require parental
consent to place her child for adoption. Therefore, the rationale for abortionrelated privacy has no serious application to a minor’s other choice rights and
is a genuine exception to the courts’ recognition of parental authority in
virtually all other environments.74

Id.
69. See HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON, supra note 42, at 136. Horowitz explains that at common
law any “unconsented touching, including touching for treatment [without parent’s consent] or
examination, is a battery;” the only exceptions to this rule were limited to emergency situations.
Id. at 136-37.
70. Id. at 140.
71. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 473 (Professor Hafen explains that in Carey v.
Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the “Court’s purpose was not to authorize a
maturity-based “choice” right, but to protect immature adolescents against the risks of pregnancy
and venereal disease.”).
72. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 89-91 (1976).
73. Id. at 91. Justice Stevens also joined the four-member dissent and supported a parental
consent form for abortions as a means of ensuring “that the decision be made correctly and with
full understanding of the consequences of either alternative.” Id. at 103.
74. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 473.
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Nevertheless, granting autonomy rights even of a “child/parent” raises an
interesting observation: children need parental consent to obtain something as
simple as dental braces, yet no consent is necessary for abortions.75
Unfortunately, the CRC fails to recognize the seeming absurdity of the
above, and, without the concern expressed by Justices Powell and Stewart in
Danforth, has granted broad privacy rights to adolescents and children. Article
16 states that “[n]o child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence.”76 Some
supporters believe that CRC article 16 grants the same right to “protections for
procreation and abortion decision-making” as those that are afforded to
adults.77 Hence, there will continue to be heated debates at UN Conferences
about granting sexual autonomy and abortion rights to children, a position that
(oddly enough) is supported by the same individuals that one might expect to
decry the sexual abuse of children.78 These ideological battles, however,
should not lose sight of the reality that most child-development experts have
long believed that “adolescent sexual activity is . . . unhealthy for children –
emotionally, psychologically, spiritually, and physically.”79
B.

The Need for Parental Authority

In the course of the discussions over the role of the CRC and the debate
over protecting children versus granting them broad autonomy rights, an
important question arises: Whose needs are being served by the outcomes
sought? As Professor Hafen has observed, “[s]ome of the adults who want to
liberate children seem motivated not primarily by children’s actual interests
but by their own interests, some ideological and some that merely serve adult
convenience.”80
Perhaps it goes without saying that of paramount importance in all actions
concerning children is a child’s “best interests,” a notion made explicit in the
CRC.81 But who, under the CRC scheme, decides what are a child’s “best
interests”? Parents are to be supported by States Parties in their “rights and
duties . . . to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a
manner consistent with [the child’s] evolving capacities.”82 How are parents to

75. Id. at 473-76.
76. CRC, supra note 1, art. 16.
77. Robert E. Shepherd, Civil Rights of the Child, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN AMERICA 143
(1990).
78. See, e.g., Hendershott, supra note 51.
79. Henry J. Redd et al., Contraception and Adolescents: A Dissent, in 21 CHILD & FAMILY
105, 106 (Herbert Ratner ed., No. 2, 1990).
80. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 478.
81. CRC, supra note 1, at art. 3(1).
82. CRC, supra note 1, art. 14(2).
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evaluate an “evolving capacity”? What if they make a mistake? What if a
parent’s notion of “best interests” conflicts with the notions of the Committee
of “ten experts” elected to “examin[e] the progress made by States Parties in
achieving the realization of the obligations undertaken in the present
Convention”?83
Perhaps most importantly, how and under what authority are States Parties
to provide “support” for parental endeavors? Increasingly, the State, in the
new transnational world, is falling under the spell of “soft law,” the influence
of non-state interest groups seeking to change national and international norms,
often by making end-runs around existing “hard law” (i.e., constitutional
provisions, statutes, or case law).84 Such behavior had an incalculable impact,
in fact, upon the drafting of the CRC itself.85
Ironically enough, participants from the United States were a major
influence in the Convention’s drafting, as “American children’s rights
advocates took the lead in developing the CRC’s unique provisions for child
autonomy”86 and, in fact, “participated actively in the ten years of intense
multilateral negotiations that led to the consensus adoption of the
Convention”87 in 1989. Such participation, coupled with the United States’
refusal to ratify the resulting document, is a source of confusion, perhaps even
83. CRC, supra note 1, art. 43(1, 2).
84. Aguirre & Wolfgram, supra note 15, at 119-20.
The changing definition of family in UN documents has been significantly influenced by
non-state actors interacting through transnational advocacy networks, with each other,
with states, and with international organizations. These non-state actors have become
significant players in international policy-making and consequently in the creation of soft
law. The legal scholars Abbot and Snidal note that “soft law” is often highly influential
and is often treated by interested actors as if it were hard law. Such has been the case
with the documents produced by the UN conferences in the last two decades: “[A]iming
for soft law bases for new norms is a preferred strategy [of civil societies at the UN]
because its status in the international political system is so ambiguous . . . Thus, soft law
is the preferred tool for those who want to change norms.
Id.; see also BEDERMAN, supra note 18, at 96.
85.
It is generally acknowledged in the international community that the NGOs had a direct
and indirect impact on this Convention that is without parallel in the history of drafting
international agreements. . . . The extent of the overall NGO contribution is . . . by no
means always clear from the travaux préparatoires. The success of the NGO’s activities
to promote support for the Convention was, for example, undoubtedly instrumental in
getting many governments to take the drafting process more seriously . . . . [R]eviewing
the final text of the Convention, the Ad Hoc Group was able to identify at least thirteen
substantive articles or paragraphs for whose inclusion in the text the NGOs had been
primarily responsible.
Cantwell, supra note 17, at 19.
86. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 449.
87. Stewart, supra note 4, at 162.
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frustration, among international observers who believed the erroneous
assertions by some American advocates “that the CRC simply restates
traditionally accepted protections for children and that their positions reflect
the current state of United States law.”88 However, the CRC drafters’
approach, in fact,
confuses children’s needs for nutrition, education, and protection (with which
the United Nations has historically, and wisely, been concerned) with
children’s alleged right to make autonomous choices. Such confusion can
undermine children’s most basic needs. The drafters evidently wished to use
avant-garde terminology that seems to place the United Nations on the cutting
edge of human rights thinking, but they have failed to see the distinction
between the applications of that terminology to adults and its applications to
children.89

Whatever the motives for the behavior, “[t]he new adult willingness to
defer to children’s preferences has occurred in the absence of empirical
evidence demonstrating that today’s children actually possess greater capacity
[than children of the past] to assume the risks and responsibilities of making
autonomous choices.”90 Indeed there appears to be some evidence to the
contrary: Children with increased autonomy typically do not make better
choices.
In the area of marriage choice, for example, Professor Lynn D. Wardle has
observed that age restrictions on marriage have a direct correlation to marital
stability: “Age restrictions are widely considered necessary to prevent
immature persons from entering marriages that are likely to fail. Marriage
restrictions are believed to protect the individuals involved from the traumas of

88. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 460.
89. Id. at 486.
90. See id. at 478 (also stating that
[i]t is therefore natural to wonder whose interests are being served by the resurgence of
interest in liberation and autonomy for children reflected in the CRC and in today’s
cultural echoes of CRC themes. Some of the adults who want to liberate children seem
motivated not primarily by children’s actual interests but by their own interests, some
ideological and some that merely serve adult convenience. Because the tutorial yoke
between adults and children is a mutual one, adults face a beguiling conflict of interest in
thinking about autonomy for children. When they disengage from the arduous task of
rearing and teaching children in the purported name of increasing those children’s
freedom, adults’ actual – even if not fully conscious – purpose may be to increase their
own freedom by liberating themselves from the burdens of providing meaningful
education and child care. Worse yet some pro-child autonomy claims may be essentially
a façade intended to protect the interests of adults who profit from such claims while
indirectly exploiting the actual interests of children.
Id. at 478-479.
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divorce and to protect society from the burdens of broken families.”91 In fact,
some studies find that “couples who marry young are overrepresented in
divorce actions, and tend to break up sooner than other marriages.”92 Most at
risk for divorce are men who marry between fourteen and nineteen years of age
and women who marry between fourteen and seventeen.93 It is the rare child
who is equipped to face the weighty and lonely decisions that come with
adolescent marriage.
Indeed, it may be asserted that there is a need within the international
community to rediscover the virtues of parental authority. Marriage and
parenthood, as understood and practiced for centuries, have marked benefits
for marital partners and their offspring. A growing body of research shows
that traditional heterosexual marriage has significant benefits for adults94 as
well as for their children. For example, children living with their biological
parents have significant advantages in education,95 suffer less from poverty,96
91. LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 2002).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 3 (1998). “Married people are
generally healthier; they live longer, earn more, have better mental health and better sex lives, and
are happier than their unmarried counterparts. Furthermore, married individuals have lower rates
of suicide, fatal accidents, acute and chronic illnesses, alcoholism, and depression than other
people.” Id.
95. Studies consistently show that children in an intact natural family are significantly less
likely to drop out of high school than children in a one-parent family. See Linda J. Waite, Does
Marriage Matter? 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 494 (1995). In some studies, the likelihood of
dropping out more than doubles for children in single-parent households. Id. at 494. Importantly,
Waite notes that the statistics regarding the likelihood of dropping out of school for children of
single-parent households, “take into account differences in a number of characteristics that affect
educational attainment,” thus accentuating the accuracy of the statistics’ indications. Id.
Children of non-traditional families are also more likely to have lower grades and other measures
of academic achievement. See Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of
the Amato and Keith (1991) Meta-Analysis 15 J. OF FAM. PSYCHOL., 355, 365 (2001); see also
William H. Jeynes, The Effects of Several of the Most Common Family Structures on the
Academic Achievement of Eighth Graders, 30 MARRIAGE AND FAM. REV., 73, 84 (2001). Finally,
children of divorced parents are more likely to have lower occupational status and earnings and
have increased rates of unemployment. See generally Catherine E. Ross & John Mirowsky,
Parental Divorce, Life-Course Disruption, and Adult Depression, 61 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE
FAM. 1034, 1040, 1043 (1999).
96. Studies show that children raised outside marriage are more likely to be raised in poor
economic conditions. See Waite, supra note 95, at 494. Even after controlling for race and
family backgrounds, children raised outside of marriage suffer not only from economic
deprivations, but also from a lack of parental attention and from high rates of residential
relocation, all of which can work to disadvantage the child’s development. See Pamela J. Smock
et al., The Effect of Marriage and Divorce on Women’s Economic Well-Being, 64 AM. SOC. REV.,
794, 805, 810 (1999); see also Ross Finnie, Women Men and the Economic Consequences of
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commit fewer crimes,97 and are better adjusted socially than children living in
single-parent homes or step-parent homes.98
These benefits do not flow from the beneficent impact of some
governmental action or bureaucracy. Research demonstrates that these
benefits flow directly from well-functioning, two-parent households.99
Therefore, except in those cases where it can be shown that parents are
incapable or incompetent to perform their important roles as protectors and
mentors of their children, they should have full authority to make the decisions
that most affect the daily lives of their children. While many international
proposals that interfere with (or even eliminate) parental authority are wellintentioned, no local, national or international agency can make decisions for
children that are superior to those made by a reasonably well functioning twoparent family. However well-intentioned, no international law – including the
CRC – should be construed so as to deprive parents of the authority to
determine, on their own, what is in the best interests of their children.

Divorce: Evidence from Canadian Longitudinal Data, 30 CANADIAN REV. OF SOC. AND
ANTHROP., 205 (1993) (finding that the presence of two parents potentially means more parental
supervision and more parental time helping with homework).
97. Adolescents with married parents are least likely to use marijuana, cocaine, or smoke
cigarettes. PATRICK FAGAN ET AL., THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE: A BOOK OF CHARTS
35-36, 38 (The Heritage Foundation 2002). Children with non-traditional family structures are
twice as likely to use marijuana or cocaine and are 30 percent more likely to have experimented
with cigarettes than children with two biological parents. Id.
98. “[C]hildren of divorce do not accept monitoring or supervision from live-in partners
nearly as much as they do from married parents.” Sanford M. Dornbusch et al., Single
Parenthood, 33 SOC’Y 30 (1996). Young women from single-parent households are more likely
to give birth out of wedlock, and young adults are more likely both to be out of school and the
labor force. See Waite, supra note 94, at 494. Furthermore, “children who spend part of their
childhood in a single-parent family . . . report significantly lower-quality relationships with their
parents as adults and have less frequent contact with them.” Id. at 495 (citing Diane N. Lye et al.,
Childhood Living Arrangements and Adult Children’s Relations with Their Parents, 32
DEMOGRAPHY 261, 271-72 (1995)). Children of fragmented or divorced families are also more
likely to commit suicide and have higher risks of obtaining mental illnesses. See WILLIAM J.
DOHERTY ET AL., WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY ONE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 14-15 (Center for the American Experiment Coalition for Marriage, Family and
Couples Education Institute for American Values 2002) (stating that high rates of family
fragmentation are associated with an increased risk of suicide among both adults and adolescents.
Id.) In the last half-century, suicide rates among teens and young adults have tripled. David M.
Cutler et al., National Bureau of Economic Research, Explaining the Rise of Youth Suicide,
Working Paper 7713 at 37, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7713.pdf (last visited Feb.
23, 2003). The single “most important of these variables is the female divorce rate. . . [the] effect
is large . . . [as it] can explain as much as two-thirds of the increase of youth suicides.” Id.
99. See supra notes 94-96.
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III. WHY CONGRESS LACKS THE POWER TO RATIFY THE CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
To this point, we have examined the competition between the conception
of “human rights” that undergirds the CRC and some long-held notions about
the actual “best interests” of the world’s children. We now turn to the second
of our major arguments: however well or illogically grounded in international
human rights theory and practice, the United States Congress lacks the power
to impress the CRC upon the constituent sovereignties collectively known as
the United States of America.
Professor David Stewart, formerly Assistant Legal Adviser for Human
Rights and Refugees in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. State
Department, summarized the situation in 1998: “[S]ome Convention provisions
arguably pose questions when compared with U.S. law and practice. Some
provisions specify substantive rights that are thus far unknown as legally
enforceable rights in U.S. law. Some provisions express rights protected under
U.S. law, but appear to mandate steps beyond what the United States is able, or
willing, to do.”100 Such issues, suggests Professor Stewart, might be explored
and resolved as part of the debate over United States ratification of the CRC.
He further suggests a series of “innovative” approaches to implementation and
enforcement of Convention provisions.101
However, under the provisions of the Constitution, Congress has power to
pass federal laws binding the states only in certain limited circumstances.
Such power most often has been invoked under the auspices of Article I,
100. Stewart, supra note 4, at 172.
101. Id. at 183-84.
One hurdle to U.S. implementation of this aspect of the Convention at a meaningful level
is conceptual. Traditionally, United States society has not regarded economic and social
benefits as legally required or enforceable “rights” but rather as discretionary services or
programs that may be amended or rescinded solely on the basis of political or budgetary
considerations. The Convention has been viewed by some as calling for substantial new
programs for children with significant resource implications. It is not entirely clear, for
example, how the federal government could or would effectively guarantee the right of
every child in the country “to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health”
or “to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and
social well-being,” but some steps must necessarily be taken to achieve the goals.
Difficult decisions will need to be made regarding the level of resource commitments to
be devoted to implementing the Convention, how and by whom they will be funded, and
who will administer delivery. In some areas, this may require provision of new services.
Even where programs do provide services for care, protection, and support at state levels,
more than a few are underfunded, poorly staffed and overburdened. There is little
question, for example, that additional steps to improve health care delivery to the least
fortunate, and to reduce the infant mortality rate, would be entirely consistent with the
objectives of the Convention.
Id.
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section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, commonly known as the “Commerce
Clause.” Commerce Clause Jurisprudence has been a controversial field, at
times approving the venturing of Congress into areas only obliquely related to
actual interstate commerce.102 Most recently, however, the Supreme Court has
retreated from a broad application of the clause, and in the interest of
preserving state and federal distinctions, has declined to find legitimate
extension of Commerce Clause power into areas not directly related to
interstate commerce.
A.

An Overview of Commerce Power Jurisprudence

Congress lacks the power to ratify the CRC because the provisions of the
Convention are outside the commerce power, as presently conceived.
Commerce Clause jurisprudence springs from the 1824 case of Gibbons v.
Ogden,103 in which Chief Justice Marshall offered the first definition of
Congress’s power to regulate “the commercial intercourse between nations,
and parts of nations,”104 thus describing the “Federal commerce power with a
breadth never yet exceeded.”105 (Significantly, Gibbons also articulated the
notion that “state laws must yield to federal laws with which they conflict.”)106
Nevertheless, even this expansive interpretation of congressional power
has limits. Those limits, were reached in the 1995 decision of United States v.
Lopez.107 In Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zone Act,
which made it a “federal offense ‘for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe,
is a school zone.’”108 The Court found three distinct areas that Congress may
regulate under the commerce power: (1) channels of interstate commerce, (2)
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) “those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce.”109 The Lopez Court scrutinized
the legislation under the third category and held it to be unconstitutional
because, in part, the statute was “not an essential part of a larger regulation of
102. See Christine M. Devey, Note, Commerce Clause, Enforcement Clause, or Neither? The
Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 34 U. RICH. L.
REV. 567, 568-73 (2000); see also Michael Bono, Judicial Limitations on Congressional Power
Under United States v. Morrison, 2 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 229, 234-42 (2001), and also San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973), and Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964).
103. 22 U.S. 1, 215 (1824).
104. Id. at 189-90.
105. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193-95).
106. NORMAN REDLICH ET AL.,, UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50 (2nd ed.,
1999).
107. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
108. Id. at 562 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1998 ed., Supp V)).
109. Id. at 558-59.
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economic activity.”110 The Court thus established a new standard for
Commerce Clause interpretation.
This new standard, however, has deep roots. The Lopez analysis reiterates
a long-standing constitutional limitation on congressional power. Citing James
Madison, the Court noted “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are
to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”111
Madison’s clear assertion that the states reserved all the powers not specifically
delegated to the federal government supports the Lopez view that commerce
power has real limitations. Especially in lawmaking areas traditionally left to
individual states, the federal government has no power to create law.112
The majority in Lopez acknowledged that the new standard might create
legal uncertainty, but concluded that legal uncertainty is more palatable than
ceding limitless power to Congress, thereby forfeiting the scheme of
enumerated powers and separate levels of government that are fundamental to
a federal system.113 In such a decentralized system, each level of government,
federal and state, will exercise authority over certain delimited areas.114 The
elimination of any restraint on commerce power would “effectually obliterate
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government.”115
The line drawn in Lopez was reaffirmed just three years ago in United
States v. Morrison.116 In Morrison, the Court invalidated the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, which announced that all persons within the United
States “shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender.”117 To enforce that right, the Act provided that a woman who was a
victim of such a crime could bring a civil suit against the perpetrator in federal
court.118 The Court held the statute unconstitutional for the same reasons as in
Lopez.
First, the activity being regulated was essentially non-economic. In fact,
the Court bluntly stated that violence against women is not “in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity.”119 More importantly, the Court asserted that
holding the statute valid would disrupt the national and local distinction: “The
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Id. at 561.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, 292-93 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (1788).
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 557.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 13981, invalidated by Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
Id.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
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Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local. . . . The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate
commerce has always been the province of the States.”120 If the statute in
question in Morrison had passed constitutional muster, Congress arguably
could regulate any activity as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that
activity has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or
consumption.121 This the Court pointedly refused to do.
B.

The CRC Violates Current Commerce Clause Interpretation.

The CRC embodies substantive policy determinations well beyond the
limits of congressional power under Lopez and Morrison. If Congress lacks
the power to bar handguns from the vicinity of schools or to create a federal
civil remedy for violent acts against women, it certainly lacks power to enact
laws that regulate intra-familial relationships. Under the Lopez and Morrison
interpretation of the commerce power, Congress simply lacks authority to
demand the substantive outcomes that the CRC envisions.
The CRC does not involve channels or instrumentalities of commerce. In
fact, the terms of the CRC, and specifically those in articles 13, 14, and 15,
have no commercial impetus whatsoever. Article 13 provides freedom of
expression.122 Article 14 provides freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion.123 Article 15 grants children freedom of association and of peaceful
assembly.124 These “rights” as guaranteed under the CRC are socially and
politically based and do not deal with interstate commerce. The terms of the
CRC are not “commercial” in nature, nor do they deal with any “economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”125 The CRC thus
fails all three levels of analysis under the Lopez test.
Moreover, the ratification of a binding international treaty by creating
federal law where traditionally local governments have legislated would most
assuredly disrupt the national and local distinction that the Constitution of the
United States has firmly established. Traditionally, all family law matters have
been reserved to the States to legislate.126 Federal imposition into such matters
violates the balance of state and federal powers as outlined in the Tenth
Amendment. CRC article 27 specifically admonishes State Parties to provide
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for minors’ “physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.”127
Morrison specifically expressed the Court’s concern that, if States were
relieved of their traditional legislative responsibilities, federal legislation could
be applied “equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state
regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on
the national economy is undoubtedly significant.”128
There is, notwithstanding the current strain of commerce power case law,
the possibility that the Court could consider the ratification of the Convention
constitutional under the now-discredited reasoning of Missouri v. Holland.129
In Holland, the Court held that a treaty negotiated between the United States
and Great Britain created congressional power to regulate the hunting of
migratory fowl where no such power existed before. Justice Holmes reasoned
that a treaty might override constitutional limits flowing from the Commerce
Clause or the Tenth Amendment because the national interest of protecting
migratory birds was of the “first magnitude.”130 It is conceivable that the
Supreme Court – in reliance on Missouri v. Holland – could declare that
children’s rights are of “first magnitude” importance and, therefore, are
enforceable despite and whatever the terms and limitations of the United States
Constitution.
We do not believe, however, that such a result is likely. Missouri v.
Holland created a constitutional crisis and provoked an intense and heated
congressional debate over a proposed constitutional amendment (the “Bricker
Amendment”), which would have expressly subjugated treaty provisions to
constitutional limits.131 The controversy surrounding Missouri v. Holland and
the Senator Bricker’s proposed amendment was calmed only in 1957 – almost
forty years after Holland – by Justice Black’s famous dictum in Reid v. Covert
that “treaties must comply with the constitution.”132
At this point in world history, we do not believe the Court will again walk
down the path marked by Missouri v. Holland toward the notion that Congress
can circumvent constitutional limitations (such as those announced in the
recent commerce clause cases) by ratifying inconsistent treaties. Under the
Court’s current interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the policy judgments
set out in the CRC are clearly beyond congressional reach. The aims of the
127. CRC, supra note 1, art. 27.
128. Morrison, 539 U.S. at 615-16.
129. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
130. Id. at 435.
131. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 228, 229 (14th ed.
2001).
132. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (stating that the “prohibitions of the
Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government and they cannot
be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined”).
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CRC are laudable, but in its current form, the treaty violates the very language
of the Constitution itself.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have questioned the legitimacy and wisdom of the rights
announced by the CRC. We join, however, in the conviction
that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly
children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it
can fully assume its responsibilities within the community, [and recognize]
that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her
personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of
happiness, love and understanding.133

We assert that, for the protection of the family, parents and children in the
United States can look to rights already discovered and domestic policies
already in place for the implementation and protection of those rights.
Ratifying the CRC would threaten, not enhance, the integrity of these policies.
We find most troubling the CRCs extension of autonomy rights to
children. In our view, this represents, at least in part, a self-interested
abrogation of the responsibility of adults to care for and protect children.
Fortunately, the Constitution of the United States stands as a conceptual
and institutional barrier to the universal ratification of the CRC. In spite of the
fact that the CRC exists in large part due to the efforts of certain citizens and
citizen groups from the United States, these efforts are inconsistent with the
commands of the Constitution. Thus, while discussion of the ratification of the
CRC is academically and philosophically interesting, it is legally irrelevant.

133. CRC, supra note 1, pmbl. paras. 5-6.

